where the link between national politics and EU level politics is concerned.
THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EU POLITICS
For many years, European scho lars attenlpted to create grand theories for the sake of comparing the new E U political system to that of government, politics, and policy-making in all political systems. Over the yea rs, these grand theories have b een replaced by "mid-level explanations of cross-systematic po litical processes [that act as] the intellectual prec urso rs of any theory of EU politics."] One of these grand theories, N eofunctionalisl11 , was first suggested by Ernst Haas in 1958. The basic claim of N eofunctio nalism is that "a given acti on, related to a specific goal, creates a situatio n in which the origi nal goal can be assured only by taking furth er actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for m o re, and so forth."4 A ccording to this argument, the forces behind this spillover process are nonstate ac tors, such as business associati ons, trade uni o ns, and political parties, promo ting their economic and ideological interests. H owever, N eofun cti o nalism failed to acco unt for the slowing dow n of E uropea n integrati o n in the 1960s, and the strengthening of the intergovernmental elements of the E uropean Conll1l1nity (EC). N ew theories had to be developed .
(Liberal) IntClgovCfmf/ cn talisl'I1. D erived from the realist school of international relations, Intergovernmentalism argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions of the E uropean nation states with the aim of p rotecting their geopolitical interests, such as national security and sovereignty. Intergovernmentalist theory draws on general theories of b argaining and negotiation to view the EU as a forum in which interstate bargaining o utcom es are decisively shaped by the relative power of nation-states. This relative power among states is arguably shaped by asymmetrical interdependence. In this model, governm ents that stand to benefit the most from an agreem ent relative to their alternatives tend to offer g reater compromises. 5 This pursuit of national self-interest, strategic rationality, and policy outcomes dependent on relative power, can attribute for the continued cooperation between states within the E U bargaining arena. In this model, policymaking is seen as taking the shape of a " unidirecti o nal causal chain beginning with the preferences of societal actors and p owerful constituencies and translated through the state to the natio nal interests and positions w hich are then represented in Brussels negotiations. "6 Liberal-Intergovernmentalis11l, first argued for by M oravcsik, divides the EU decision making process into two stages: in the first there is a demand for EU policies from dom estic econo mic and social actors; in the second sta ge EU p oli cies are supplied by intergovernmental bargains, such as treaty refo rms. As in classic Intergovernmentalism, M ember States are still treated as unitary actors and the supranational institutions of the EU have a limited impact o n final o utcom es. Liberal-Intergoverrunentalism differs in that it argues state preferences are driven by economic rather than geopolitical interests, that state preferences are not fixed, and that states ' preferences va ry from issue to issue. 7 While Intergovernmentalist theories present a plausible explana ti on for the m an ner in which M ember States come to decide o n and adopt conlllon European policies, they face a number of criticisms. In particular, these criticism s are aimed at their accounts of preference formati on and their understanding of decision making in the council. It has b een argued that Intergovernmentalism fails to account for negotiation, bargaining, or conflict between ministries, ministers, and/or officials, each with their own constituencies and clienteles. 8 C ritics point out that the state executives are pressured by the policy initiatives where the link between national politics and EU level politics is concerned.
(Liberal) IntClgovCfmf/ cn talisl'I1. D erived from the realist school of international relations, Intergovernmentalism argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions of the E uropean nation states with the aim of p rotecting their geopolitical interests, such as national security and sovereignty. Intergovernmentalist theory draws on general theories of b argaining and negotiation to view the EU as a forum in which interstate bargaining o utcom es are decisively shaped by the relative power of nation-states. This relative power among states is arguably shaped by asymmetrical interdependence. In this model, governm ents that stand to benefit the most from an agreem ent relative to their alternatives tend to offer g reater compromises. 5 This pursuit of national self-interest, strategic rationality, and policy outcomes dependent on relative power, can attribute for the continued cooperation between states within the E U bargaining arena. In this model, policymaking is seen as taking the shape of a " unidirecti o nal causal chain beginning with the preferences of societal actors and p owerful constituencies and translated through the state to the natio nal interests and positions w hich are then represented in Brussels negotiations."6 Liberal-Intergovernmentalis11l, first argued for by M oravcsik, divides the EU decision making process into two stages: in the first there is a demand for EU policies from dom estic econo mic and social actors; in the second sta ge EU p oli cies are supplied by intergovernmental bargains, such as treaty refo rms. As in classic Intergovernmentalism, M ember States are still treated as unitary actors and the supranational institutions of the EU have a limited impact o n final o utcom es. Liberal-Intergoverrunentalism differs in that it argues state preferences are driven by economic rather than geopolitical interests, that state preferences are not fixed, and that states ' preferences va ry from issue to issue. 7 While Intergovernmentalist theories present a plausible explana ti on for the m an ner in which M ember States come to decide o n and adopt conlllon European policies, they face a number of criticisms. In particular, these criticism s are aimed at their accounts of preference formati on and their understanding of decision making in the council. It has b een argued that Intergovernmentalism fails to account for negotiation, bargaining, or conflict between ministries, ministers, and/or officials, each with their own constituencies and clienteles. 8 C ritics point out that the state executives are pressured by the policy initiatives http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/6 of the supranatio nal E uro pean Commissio n (EC) , and influenced by the anticipated reactions and possible positio ns of o ther internation al actors. 9 T hose same critics, naturall y, have proposed their own theories about the way in w hich Europe is Europeanizing.
Supral1ationaiisl'Il. Some theorists attempt to account for criticism s of Intergovernmentalisrn by arguing for a Supranatio nal interpretation of the EU. They view the EU as a complex institutional and policy envi ro nment, with multiple and ever changing interests and actors, as well as limited info nnati on about the lo ng-term implicati ons of treaty reforms o r day-to-day legislative o r executive decisions. T h ey claim that th e Member State govermnents are no t in full control , and that the sup ra national institutio ns exert significant independent influence o n instituti o nal policy outcomes . This conceptualization argues that " the E U [is] a network in w hich individual m ember states are increasingly defined no t by themselves but in relatio n to their EU partners, and in which they prefer to intera ct with o ne another rather than third parties because those interacti o ns create incenti ves for selfinterested cooperati o n ." I 0
In this model , M ember States have realized that there is m o re to gain by working within the system than by going at it by themselves. l ! T he increased administrative interacti on b etween national officials has arguably brought abo ut a fu sio n of m ember state bureaucracies. Consequ ently, civil servants n o longer act as 'guard dogs' of national interests when considering EU po licy. Instead , they see Brussels as an arena in w hich routine decisio ns are taken and the offi cials of o ther Member States are partners. 12 H owever, M oravcsik contends that the entrepreneurship of supranational offi cials tends to be futil e and re dundant, as "gove rnments generally find it easy to act as their own entrepreneurs and to impose distributional bargains through the use of traditional nonmilitar y instruments of power p olitics ... The distributive outcomes of negotiations have refl ected not the preferences of supranational acto rs but the pattern of asymmetrical interdependen ce among po licy preferences." 13 O ther critics assert that the creati on and evolution of tlus supranatio nal institutio n as a step in the direction of a type of E urofederalism .
Fusion Theory. B y approaching E uropeaniza tion in terms of the problems which it p oses and the opportUluties it creates for domestic political managem ent, theorists have been able to reconcile the differences b etween nati onal adaptation and national convergence, providing a framework in which both Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism can coexist. 14 The governments of Member states "must find the m eans to reconcile potentially contradicto ry E uro pean and do mestic pressures, as regards b o th substantive policy choices and broader discourses of leg itimation." 15 In certain circumstances, particular M ember States nuy be fa ced with having to implement policy choices that enjoy little domestic suppo rt. However, these M ember States may also find that the opportunity structures of policy-m aking in the E U have b een changed in a manner which lllay be positively utilized by national governments. 16 R o bert Putnam's 'two-level games' model views European bargaining as under a do uble constraint: natio nal governments must make policy decisions that are acceptable b o th domestically and internatio nalIy.17 As such , it is possible fo r Member States to use do m estic opposition as leverage for bargaining in European negotiations.
Along this sam e vein of thinking, M aurer and Wessels have posited a fu sion theory that helps to identify interrelated processes of Europeanization between M ember States and E U institutions, and national and European adnunistrative system s. They argue that
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of the supranatio nal E uro pean Commissio n (EC) , and influenced by the anticipated reactions and possible positio ns of o ther internation al actors. 9 T hose same critics, naturall y, have proposed their own theories about the way in w hich Europe is Europeanizing. Supral1ationaiisl'Il. Some theorists attempt to account for criticism s of Intergovernmentalisrn by arguing for a Supranatio nal interpretation of the EU. They view the EU as a complex institutional and policy envi ro nment, with multiple and ever changing interests and actors, as well as limited info nnati on about the lo ng-term implicati ons of treaty reforms o r day-to-day legislative o r executive decisions. T h ey claim that th e Member State govermnents are no t in full control , and that the sup ra national institutio ns exert significant independent influence o n instituti o nal policy outcomes . This conceptualization argues that " the E U [is] a network in w hich individual m ember states are increasingly defined no t by themselves but in relatio n to their EU partners, and in which they prefer to intera ct with o ne another rather than third parties because those interacti o ns create incenti ves for selfinterested cooperati o n ." I 0
Along this sam e vein of thinking, M aurer and Wessels have posited a fu sion theory that helps to identify interrelated processes of Europeanization between M ember States and E U institutions, and national and European adnunistrative system s. They argue that [bo th] levels of interacti o n (Council Secretariat and permanent representatio ns at the EU level and m ember state institutio ns and representatives from the national level) meet in a range of committee structures that co-ordinate the views and opinions of m ember state and EC / EU administrations on a given set of issu es. Fusion theor y wo uld then expect that these arenas would act neither as the 'guard dogs' of nati o nal governments charged with controlling the E uropean Commissio n nor as forums fo r exclusively intergovernmental bargaining. 18 T lus theo ry has mu ch in commo n with the view of E uro pealuza ti o n as problem and o ppo rtunity for do mesti c political managem ent: both see nati o nal representatives to the E U as having to balance the interests of domesti c and internatio nal pressures witho ut putting too heavy an emphasis o n either. Whil e areas such as the Conmuttee fo r Home and Judicial Affairs or the C FSP cOlllnuttee are perhaps m ore representative of intergovernmental bargailung theory, I argue that the decision-making process of Econonuc and M o netary Union falls in line with Fu sio n T heory.
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
C ritics of the lack of dem ocrati c legitimacy in the EU po int to the mode of political representati o n and the nature of policy outputs. They argue that E uropean integ ratio n has reduced the representatio nal qualities of Europea n dem ocracies by concentrating an increasing amount of decisions in w hat is an exec utive d ominated political system . 19 , :W Actions taken at this E uropea n executive level are arguably beyond the control of national parliaments, as they " are much m o re isolated from natio nal parliam entary scrutiny and control than are national cabinet nunisters or bureau crats in the dOlnestic policy-making p rocess. As a result, goven m l ents can effectively igno re their parliam ents when m aking decisions in Brussels."2 1 A notable response to this claim has com e from Andrew M o ravcsik , who argues that the European Union has in fact made Executives m o re accountable to their citizens. He notes that the actio ns of government ministers are no longer scrutinized simply at hom e, but in a wider E uropean context, and that nunisters at hom e are no lo nger held to account solely fo r their dom esti c record, but also for their actions in Brussels. 22 T he EP is the only branch of the EU that is directl y elected. Though stronger than it o nce was, critics still claim that it is weak compared to the governments in the C o uncil. 23 . 24, 25 Furthermore, neither natio nal elections nor EP electio ns are 'Euro pean' electio ns: they are fought on domestic ra ther than European issues, and parties collude to keep the issue of Europe off the domestic age nda . 26 . 27 The consequ ences are that EU citizens' preferences "on issues on the EU policy agenda at best have only an indirect influence on EU policy o utcomes."28 Contrary to this, Moravcsik emphasizes the fact that the EP now has vetopower over the selecti o n of the Commission, and that legislati o n requires a majoriry support in b oth the Council and the E p 2lJ
Further claims of dem ocrati c defi cit show that the Euro pean Union is either too far rem oved trom electoral controls, o r too complex for citizens of the member states to understand and fo rm reasoned o pinio ns about. 30 In additio n to the complexiry o f the process it is also argued that EU policies are overly technical and discourage citizens trom engaging with the process. O n top of all this, theorists argue that the system lacks
[bo th] levels of interacti o n (Council Secretariat and permanent representatio ns at the EU level and m ember state institutio ns and representatives from the national level) meet in a range of committee structures that co-ordinate the views and opinions of m ember state and EC / EU administrations on a given set of issu es. Fusion theor y wo uld then expect that these arenas would act neither as the 'guard dogs' of nati o nal governments charged with controlling the E uropean Commissio n nor as forums fo r exclusively intergovernmental bargaining. 18 T lus theo ry has mu ch in commo n with the view of E uro pealuza ti o n as problem and o ppo rtunity for do mesti c political managem ent: both see nati o nal representatives to the E U as having to balance the interests of domesti c and internatio nal pressures witho ut putting too heavy an emphasis o n either. Whil e areas such as the Conmuttee fo r Home and Judicial Affairs or the C FSP cOlllnuttee are perhaps m ore representative of intergovernmental bargailung theory, I argue that the decision-making process of Econonuc and M o netary Union falls in line with Fu sio n T heory.
Further claims of dem ocrati c defi cit show that the Euro pean Union is either too far rem oved trom electoral controls, o r too complex for citizens of the member states to understand and fo rm reasoned o pinio ns about. 30 In additio n to the complexiry o f the process it is also argued that EU policies are overly technical and discourage citizens trom engaging with the process. O n top of all this, theorists argue that the system lacks http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/6 transparency. According to these arguments, the end result is that the EU has alienated European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic ideal of a citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government actors accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by claiming that the EU policy-making pro cess is more transparent than most domestic systems of governrnent. 31 Lastly and usually in accordance with some or all of the above arguments, various critics claim that the policies decided upon at the European level are not representative of the . preferences of European voters. Critics argue that "governments are able to undertake policies at the European level that they cannot pursu e at the domestic level , where they are constrained by parliaments, courts and corporatist interest group structures."32 Moravcsik counters that the EU's elaborate system of checks-and-balances ensures that an overwhelming consensus is required for any policies to be agreed. H e asserts that EU policies are the result of a compromise between all interest parties, from all Members States and all the main party oppositions. Only those on the extremes are excluded. 33 Conversely, Majone argues that the EU is essentially a 'regulatory state,' by which Pareto-eHicient outcomes (where some benefit and no one is nude worse of}) are the result. 34 , 35 He asserts that EU policy-making should not be 'democratic' in the usual m eaning of the term because an EU dominated by the EP or directly elected institutions would lead to a politicization of regulatory policy-making. This politicization would result in redistributive rather than Pareto-efficient outcomes, and thus undermine the legitim.acy of the EU.36, 37, 38 Rather than make fundamental changes, he asse rts that the EU should instead implement more transparent decision-making. Similarly, Moravcsik makes three daims to support isolation of the EU policy-making process. First, he asserts that "universal involvement in government policy is beyond the scope of any modern citizen."39 Secondly, isolating quasi-judicial decisions is essential to the protection of minority interests and the aversion of a tyranny of the majority. Third, isolated policy-makers can correct for a bias inherent in majoritarian contests. In this view, then, "the EU ITlay be more 'representative' precisely because it is, in a narrow sense, less 'democratic' ."40
INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
The following section provides a brief outline of six case studies discussed at greater length in the original Honors Thesis submitted to the UCSD Department of Political Science.
Case1: Thatcher's eviction. Because Thatcher (EDV1) was not responsive to public opinion or political parties, partisan pressures in Parliament forced her to resign. How were political parties, particularly the Conservative party, able to remove her from power, effectively changing the United Kingdom's stance on EMU?
According to Howe, Thatcher's demise came about as a result of "the poll tax, her mounting unpopularity on the doorstep, [and] personal dismay at her whole 'style of governnlent'; all these came ahead of concern about her attitude towards Europe."41 Discontent with Thatcher's policy was first voiced by the public in the 1989 EP elections, when the Labour Party enjoyed its first victory since the Conservative rise to power in 1979. Yet Thatcher remained unresponsive to growing pro-European sentiment in the transparency. According to these arguments, the end result is that the EU has alienated European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic ideal of a citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government actors accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by claiming that the EU policy-making pro cess is more transparent than most domestic systems of governrnent. 31 Lastly and usually in accordance with some or all of the above arguments, various critics claim that the policies decided upon at the European level are not representative of the . preferences of European voters. Critics argue that "governments are able to undertake policies at the European level that they cannot pursu e at the domestic level , where they are constrained by parliaments, courts and corporatist interest group structures."32 Moravcsik counters that the EU's elaborate system of checks-and-balances ensures that an overwhelming consensus is required for any policies to be agreed. H e asserts that EU policies are the result of a compromise between all interest parties, from all Members States and all the main party oppositions. Only those on the extremes are excluded. 33 Conversely, Majone argues that the EU is essentially a 'regulatory state,' by which Pareto-eHicient outcomes (where some benefit and no one is nude worse of}) are the result. 34 , 35 He asserts that EU policy-making should not be 'democratic' in the usual m eaning of the term because an EU dominated by the EP or directly elected institutions would lead to a politicization of regulatory policy-making. This politicization would result in redistributive rather than Pareto-efficient outcomes, and thus undermine the legitim.acy of the EU.36, 37, 38 Rather than make fundamental changes, he asse rts that the EU should instead implement more transparent decision-making. Similarly, Moravcsik makes three daims to support isolation of the EU policy-making process. First, he asserts that "universal involvement in government policy is beyond the scope of any modern citizen."39 Secondly, isolating quasi-judicial decisions is essential to the protection of minority interests and the aversion of a tyranny of the majority. Third, isolated policy-makers can correct for a bias inherent in majoritarian contests. In this view, then, "the EU ITlay be more 'representative' precisely because it is, in a narrow sense, less 'democratic' ."40
According to Howe, Thatcher's demise came about as a result of "the poll tax, her mounting unpopularity on the doorstep, [and] personal dismay at her whole 'style of governnlent'; all these came ahead of concern about her attitude towards Europe."41 Discontent with Thatcher's policy was first voiced by the public in the 1989 EP elections, when the Labour Party enjoyed its first victory since the Conservative rise to power in 1979. Yet Thatcher remained unresponsive to growing pro-European sentiment in the United Kingdom, continuing her isolationist policy.
The British government's parliamentary system requires that the Prime Minister have the suppo rt of the maj o rity in the House of COl1lllOl1S. As T hatcher's policy decisio ns continu ed to increase tensions within her Conservati ve Party, her grip o n the m aj o ri ty began to slip. The final blow cam e when a leading Conservative fi gure, Geoffrey H owe, gave his resignation speech , in w hi ch he claimed her isolatio nist approach to EMU would have 'g rave' ramifications fo r E ngland. 42 With the passing of a vote of no confidence, the m embers of Parliam ent we re able to renlOve Thatcher from power. Thus government structure provided political parties (IV2) with an effective m eans by which they could exert press ure o n and eventually rernove T hatcher. While the public had not played an immediate part in this vote of no con fi dence, their outspoken discontent with T hatcher's dom estic policy added further legitimacy to the Conservative Party's decisio n. H ad Conserva ti ve voters w ithin the public suppo rted Thatcher's dom estic policy, m embers within the Conserva tive Party would likely have been constrained by their constitu ents from passing a vote of no confidence.
Therefore, I conclude that broad discontent within bo th the public (IVI ) and political parties (IV2) for T hatch er's domestic and European policy decisio ns (EDV1) provided the impetus for the Conservative Party to use a vote of n o confidence to efltx tively rem ove her from pow er. Thus, by ho lding Thatch er responsible, the British parliament demonstrates that represe ntative elites to the E U can be held accountable by nati o nal legislative bodies.
Casc:?: M ajor oufmancuI'crs over public and party. Jo hn Maj o r was able to use public opinio n (IV1 ) to ratify M aastricht in the face oppositio n fro m within the then m aj o ri ty Conservative Party (IV2). H ow was this possible w hen n either the public, nor the m aj ority Conservative Party approved of Maastricht?
I argue that the answer can be found in the fact that bo th the public and Party approved of Major's do m estic policies . One month before T hatcher's resignation , o pinio n polls showed Labour 16% ah ead of the C o nservatives . 43 Yet in the 1992 elections, M aj or reversed the situatio n , bringing the Conservative Party a 7 .5% margin of victory over Labo ur. This shift dem o n strates that where Thatcher lacked the suppo rt of public opinion , M aj or enjoyed it.
When Conservative R ebels (IV2) attempted to j oin Labo ur in rej ecting the ratification of M aastricht in Parliam ent, Major was able to appeal to the partisan loyalty of their constituents, fo rcing them to vote in line w ith their Conserva tive Party, and thus approve the Treaty. 44 Even tho ugh neither public opinio n no r political parties suppo rted M ajor's European policy, approval of his domestic p olicy was such that he was able to m aintain their overall suppo rt, and thus did not have to change his EMU policy decisions. Therefo re, one can argu e that the preferences of domestic acto rs we re not represented by M aj o r, giving credence to the argument of a democratic defi cit.
Mitterrand 's N ear Catastrophe. As President of France during the development of EMU policy and M aastricht ratificatio n, Mitterrand's European policy (FDV1) was supported by public opinion (IV1) , as evide nced through the high levels of stable suppo rt fo r EU unificati o n and COlTl1no n currency up to ratificatio n . Furthermo re, Mitterrand's European policy was not challenged by the Parties (IV2) that m ade up the nati o nal assembly o r senate. H owever, Mitterrand's failure to use direct consultatio n almost resulted in the rej ectio n of his E uropean policy.
This case is interesting in that we see a drastic and negative change in the European 56
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United Kingdom, continuing her isolationist policy. The British government's parliamentary system requires that the Prime Minister have the suppo rt of the maj o rity in the House of COl1lllOl1S. As T hatcher's policy decisio ns continu ed to increase tensions within her Conservati ve Party, her grip o n the m aj o ri ty began to slip. The final blow cam e when a leading Conservative fi gure, Geoffrey H owe, gave his resignation speech , in w hi ch he claimed her isolatio nist approach to EMU would have 'g rave' ramifications fo r E ngland. 42 With the passing of a vote of no confidence, the m embers of Parliam ent we re able to renlOve Thatcher from power. Thus government structure provided political parties (IV2) with an effective m eans by which they could exert press ure o n and eventually rernove T hatcher. While the public had not played an immediate part in this vote of no con fi dence, their outspoken discontent with T hatcher's dom estic policy added further legitimacy to the Conservative Party's decisio n. H ad Conserva ti ve voters w ithin the public suppo rted Thatcher's dom estic policy, m embers within the Conserva tive Party would likely have been constrained by their constitu ents from passing a vote of no confidence.
This case is interesting in that we see a drastic and negative change in the European http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/6 policy preference of the public. To determine why, it is important that we look into the factors that m ade 48.95% of the population the vote 'no'. According to Mazzucelli , "57% voted ' no' because of the loss of French sovereignty implied . . . 55% voted ' no' in o rd er not to leave E uro pe in the hands of Brussels technocrats. Another 40% voted ' no ' out of fear of German dorninance. M ost significantly, 3 1 % voted 'no' to reject the entire French political establishment."45 As can be seen, m ost of th ose who voted 'no ' did so to dem o nstrate dissatisfacti o n with Mitterrand's Europea n policy: his willingness to give away France's sovereignty and put it in the hands of B russels technocrats. T his growing dissatisfacti on was further delllo nstr.lted in the disaster of the 1992 regio nal electio ns and the catastrophic defeat of the Left in the 1993 legislative election, when the Socialist Party obtained its worst electoral res ult since the 1960s. Thus, we see a dip in bo th European policy approval and domestic policy approval. While the majority the public and those in parties approved of Mitterrand's decisions, it ca n be said that the growing discontent amongst the public presented a ve ry real possibility of change. Case 4: Kohl Plays the W.l iting Game. As C hancello r of Germany, Helmut Ko hl's European policy (GDV1) was constrained by the public (IV1 ) in the 1989 German EP electi o ns. While the vote demonstrated that the maj ority of the public approved of Kohl's domestic and European policies, the sm all proportion that voted for the Republicans was influ ential enough to threaten the m aj ority hold of Kohl's CDU/ CSU Party in the Bundestag. Because the Republican Party ran almost entirel y on an anti-EC platfo rm , o ne can assume that those who voted for them were expressing discontent with Kohl's European policy. The results constrained Kohl from pushing ahead with further decisio n-making, as he was worried that provoking a debate on E MU would furth er tarnish his already suffering public reputatio n. Ko hl's weariness paid off, when, in the D ecember 1990 unificati o n electio ns, the public voted to reelect him, thus allowing him to act auto nomously when making European decisions. T he focus of tlus election was principally German unification; European issues were hardly mentioned. While this is a comparatively weak case in demonstrating the influ ence of the public over a DV (as they did not change his decisions, but m erely m ade him wait to act), it demonstrates the impo rtance of approval of domestic policies as a deternunant factor.
Case5: Kohl trumps public disapproval. C hancellor Kohl (GDV1) was able to assert the decisions made on EMU in Maastricht n egotiations with overwhelnung support from parties in the Bundestag and Bundesrat. While the public was presented a channel for challenging the decisio ns m ade by Kohl through Constitutional Court, they were unable to legitinuze their anti-EMU stance.
T his case differs from the previous cases in that public opiluon seem s to have had little direct bearing on the o utcom e. The German Bundestag and Bundesrat overwhelnungly supported Kohl's EMU policy decisions. The fact that Ko hl required approval from the main legislative bodies of the Germ.an government provides evidence that counters the democratic deficit claim that elite representatives to the EU are b eyond the control of national parliaments. The support of the B undestag and Bundesrat also allowed the Kohl government to avoid direct public consultation.
With no election o n the horizon, Kohl's government would not have been overly concerned about any potential dip in their approval rating. Further quelling these fears was the fact that the public at the time approved of Kohl's dom estic policies. Because electio ns
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policy preference of the public. To determine why, it is important that we look into the factors that m ade 48.95% of the population the vote 'no'. According to Mazzucelli , "57% voted ' no' because of the loss of French sovereignty implied . . . 55% voted ' no' in o rd er not to leave E uro pe in the hands of Brussels technocrats. Another 40% voted ' no ' out of fear of German dorninance. M ost significantly, 3 1 % voted 'no' to reject the entire French political establishment."45 As can be seen, m ost of th ose who voted 'no ' did so to dem o nstrate dissatisfacti o n with Mitterrand's Europea n policy: his willingness to give away France's sovereignty and put it in the hands of B russels technocrats. T his growing dissatisfacti on was further delllo nstr.lted in the disaster of the 1992 regio nal electio ns and the catastrophic defeat of the Left in the 1993 legislative election, when the Socialist Party obtained its worst electoral res ult since the 1960s. Thus, we see a dip in bo th European policy approval and domestic policy approval. While the majority the public and those in parties approved of Mitterrand's decisions, it ca n be said that the growing discontent amongst the public presented a ve ry real possibility of change. Case 4: Kohl Plays the W.l iting Game. As C hancello r of Germany, Helmut Ko hl's European policy (GDV1) was constrained by the public (IV1 ) in the 1989 German EP electi o ns. While the vote demonstrated that the maj ority of the public approved of Kohl's domestic and European policies, the sm all proportion that voted for the Republicans was influ ential enough to threaten the m aj ority hold of Kohl's CDU/ CSU Party in the Bundestag. Because the Republican Party ran almost entirel y on an anti-EC platfo rm , o ne can assume that those who voted for them were expressing discontent with Kohl's European policy. The results constrained Kohl from pushing ahead with further decisio n-making, as he was worried that provoking a debate on E MU would furth er tarnish his already suffering public reputatio n. Ko hl's weariness paid off, when, in the D ecember 1990 unificati o n electio ns, the public voted to reelect him, thus allowing him to act auto nomously when making European decisions. T he focus of tlus election was principally German unification; European issues were hardly mentioned. While this is a comparatively weak case in demonstrating the influ ence of the public over a DV (as they did not change his decisions, but m erely m ade him wait to act), it demonstrates the impo rtance of approval of domestic policies as a deternunant factor.
With no election o n the horizon, Kohl's government would not have been overly concerned about any potential dip in their approval rating. Further quelling these fears was the fact that the public at the time approved of Kohl's dom estic policies. Because electio ns are primarily focused o n do m estic issues, a contrary E uropean policy would not necessarily threate n Kohl 's hold on power. T hus, even though the public did no t agree with Ko hl and the parties in regd rds to European policy, their support of his party's do mestic policy was such that there was no fea r abo ut disagreeing with them.
Case 6: Danish r~feren dum rejects Maastrich t. Danish Prime Minister Schluter (DkDV 1) was made to change decisio ns o n EM U in M aastricht negotiatio ns b ecause political parties (IV2) prevented him ti-om securing the five-sixths maj o rity in Parliament needed to avoid a referendum, and because the subsequent public referendum (IV1) o n Maastricht narrowly fa iled.
In D enmark 's Parli ament, a bill must achieve a fi ve-sixths m aj o ri ty to approve the delegatio n of nati o nal powers to international authoriti es witho ut a referendum . B ut beca use tllis m 'Uo rity was no t reached, the decision was put directl y into the hands of the public by m eans of a referendum. T he fact that the D anish Folketing was able to rej ect the decisio ns of Schli.iter provides evidence contrary to the dem ocrati c defi cit argument that representative elites to the EU are not h eld acco untable fo r their actions by natio nal parliam ents. When the referendum rolled around, the public voted to rej ect ratificatio n of M aas tricht. The reaso n fo r the Danish 'no ' was m ainl y related to E uro p ean ConU1ll1nity / European Unio n issues, and not dissatisfacti on with their leaders or for ulterio r motives. 46 Therefore, it can be said that regardless of whether the public approved of dom estic policy, they j oined the parties in disapproving of E uropean policy. The combined disa pproval of these two allowed them to change the DV appropriately.
D elle/oping a Theory. T he results of the study dem o nstrate that if public opinio n (IV1 ) and political parties (IV2) are aligned, and there is disa pproval of the (Europea n policy decisio ns/ stances ot) DV, then the DV w ill change (Case 1, Case 4, Case 6). Conve rsely, w here public opinion (IV1) and political parties (IV2) are aligned , and there is approva l of (Eu rop ean policy decisions/stan ces o t) DV, then DV will rem ain unchanged (Case 3). It was also demonstrated that where public opinion (IVI) and political parties (IV2) are unaligned , the approval of the domestic policies of policymakers becorn es an important facto r. Because politicians are strategic acto rs, they must ride party or public o pinio n. Thus, if the public and parties are not ali gned over E uropean policy but do both approve of domestic policy, elite policym akers can assert their E uropean policy witho ut fear of losing any impending electi o ns o r the confidence of their party (Case 2, 5). Conversely, if there is disapproval of do m estic policies from either, the DV will be forced to change. For further discussio n , see complete Thesis.
IMPLICATIONS
The goal of this study was to assess the influ en ce that the public and political parties have over the European policy choices m ade by their elite represen ta tives to the Europ ean Unio n. Research was narrowed to the impact tha t public opinion and political parties within France, England, Germany, and Denmark had on elite policynukers participating in the supranational development of Econonlic and M o netary Union (EMU) .
This study shows that there exist elem ents of dem ocratic connection under certain conditio ns, w hereby elites participating in EU policymaking are respo nsive to what political parties and the public w ithin their M ember State advocate. While in some regards this reailinns standard views of the E uropean political system , it also serves to add additio nal complexities to the debate. T he following pages address som e of these implicatio ns.
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http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/6 bnplications Jar Theories Ilf European Integration and Politics. In its simplest fo rm, Intergovernmentalism asserts that European integration is driven by the interest and actions of elites in European Member States, who act to protect their geopolitical interests, such as national security and sovereignty. These geopolitical interests are arguably shaped by the preferen ces of societal actors , such as parties and the public. Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, a more updated theory p osited by Moravcsik, m aintains that econom.ic, rather than geopolitical interests, are the driving forces behind the decisions made by these representatives. 47 The results of tills study show that the impetus for EMU was provided by both geopolitically and economically-driven elites from within Member States, particularly France and Germany. It further shows that in many cases, these elites were constrained by, and acted in accordallce with, the interests of societal actors. However, the fact that the guidelines for EMU policy were supplied by the supranational Delors Report. rather than by national actors m aking intergovernmental bargains, lends support to Sa ndholtz's counterargument, namely that state executives are pressured by the po licy initiatives of the supranational European Commission (EC).48 Furthermore, we also see that in many of these cases the preferen ces of societal actors did not, and often could no t influence the preferen ces of elite policym.akers . The results of this study thus imply that the Intergoverl1l11entalist bottom-up approach to EU integration cannot, on its own, provide an adequate explanation for the relatio nship between domestic actors and representative elites.
The essential claim of Supranationalisll1 is that M ember States are not in fi.llI control.
Rather, it is the supranational EU institutions that exert significant independent influence on institutional policy outcomes. The domesti c implications of this theo ry are that the bureaucracies of Member States have become fused together, and most pertinent to this study, that there has b een a dilution of natio nal preferences in tavor of European partnersillp. 49 While the tact that the Delors Committee set the guidelines tor EMU does support this theory, this study reaffirms Moravcsik's contention that it is not necessaril y the European institutions that always set the tempo for integrationist policy. A glaring example of this was made by Denmark's first Maastricht referendum, whereby national actors were able to counter EMU guidelines, providing, and ultimately implem enting their own exceptions to the Treaty. Similarly, the claim that there has b een a dilution of national interests is countered by the fact that, in some cases, domestic actors were able to assert their national preferences and constrain or change the decisions that their natio nal elites made when negotiating in the EU. Therefore, it can be argued that Supranationalisl1l does not provide an adequate explanation of the interaction between domestic actors and national elites, or of that between elites and the institutions of the ED.
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to EU policies. Thus, the results of this study do not provide evidence contrary to this theory. Rather, they reaffirm that indeed, both supranational and national pressures playa vital role in determining the policy outcomes of EU negotiation .
il11plicatiol15 for th e Democratic Deficit. One of the primary arguments for the lack of dernocratic legitimacy in the EU is that European integration has reduced the representational qualities of European democracies by concentrating an increasing amount of decisions in what is an executive dominated political system. 52. 53 Actions taken at this European executive level are arguably beyond the control of national parliaments, as they "a re llIuch 1lI0re isolated frolll national parliamentary scrutiny and control than are national ca binet ministers or bureaucrats in the domestic policy-making process. As a result, governments can effectively ignore their parliaments when making decisions in Brussels."54 On one hand, this study has made it apparent that permissive consensus allows elites to avoid democratic consultation wllile the supranational decision-making process is taking place. At the same time, however, the results align with Moravcsik's counterargument that the E uropean Union has in fact m ade executives more accountable to their citizens. 55 One such example of national parliaments keeping a check on the actions of their representative elites occurred when the British Parliament's held Thatcher responsible not simply at home, but also in a wider European context. It seems, therefore, that while there is little democratic consultation , the actions taken at the European executive level are not necessarily beyond the control of national parliam ents.
Wllile the EP is the only branch of the EU that is directl y elected, critics have demonstrated that it is weak compared to the governments in the Council. 56 , 57, 58 Neither national elections nor EP electio ns are 'European' elections: they are fought on domestic rather than European issues, and parties collude to keep the issue of Europe off the domestic age nda S9 ,60 The consequences are that EU citizens' preferen ces "on issues on the EU policy age nda at best have only an indirect influence on EU policy outcomes."61 While, this study confirms a lack of genuine 'European' elections, it also demonstrates that the public can utilize elections as effective m eans by which to constrain the European policy decisions of their national elites. As demonstrated in the 1989 EP elections in Germany, negative results persuaded Kohl to take a different approach to EMU. Sinlilarly, the Conservative Party's loss in the 1989 British EP elections demonstrated public disapproval with Thatcher's European policy. While these electi o ns did no t directly result in a change of her policy, they marked the beginning of her downfall as Prime Minister. It can b e argued, thus, that the indirect influence of elections is very real, regardless of their lacking a European focus. At the sam e time, however, this indirect influence confirms the EPs inability to directly act as a legitimate democratic institution.
Further claims of democratic deficit show that the European Union is either too far removed from electoral controls, or too complex for citizens of the 11lember states to understand and form reasoned opinions about. 62 According to such arguments, the EU has alienated European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic ideal of a citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government actors accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by clainling that the EU policy-making process is more transparent than most domestic systems of government. 63 While the results of this study do not directly address this aspect of the democratic deficit, they do in many ways confirm the detrimental consequences of this problem. For example, low EP election turnout can be attributed to the indifference of to EU policies. Thus, the results of this study do not provide evidence contrary to this theory. Rather, they reaffirm that indeed, both supranational and national pressures playa vital role in determining the policy outcomes of EU negotiation .
Further claims of democratic deficit show that the European Union is either too far removed from electoral controls, or too complex for citizens of the 11lember states to understand and form reasoned opinions about. 62 According to such arguments, the EU has alienated European citizens with serious repercussions for both the traditional democratic ideal of a citizenry educated in the governmental process, and the ideal of government actors accountable to the general public. Moravcsik counters this argument by clainling that the EU policy-making process is more transparent than most domestic systems of government. 63 While the results of this study do not directly address this aspect of the democratic deficit, they do in many ways confirm the detrimental consequences of this problem. For example, low EP election turnout can be attributed to the indifference of http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/6 voters towards European issues, indirectly compounding their already lacking democratic nature. Furthermore, voter alienation m ay acco unt for the persuadability of the European public, the consequences of which can be seen in France's M aastricht referendum, whereby the decisions of Mitterrand, who had eqjoyed one of the largest European policy approval ratings in Europe, was nearl y vetoed at the last moment by those opposed to ratification. Thus, it can be seen that by distan cing itself from E uropean citizens, the EU has threatened the traditional democratic ideal of citizenry educated in the governmental process.
Finally, the results of this study substantiate the claim that policies decided upo n at the E uropean level are no t representative European voter preferences. In the m ajori ty of cases studied in this paper, it ca n be seen that the public did not suppo rt th e European policies decided on by their elite representatives. In some cases, these decisions were amended so as to represent the interests of the public. In o thers they were not. T his raises an impo rtant question : In such a vast and complex system , can the interests and preferences of every individu al actor be reconciled? At the m om ent, the answer seem s to b e a definitive no. For now, it appears that policies in the EU will must come abo ut as a res ult of comprOlnises b etween interest parties from all the M embers States and all the main party o ppositions. 64 Implicatiolls for the Future. The evidence against Inte rgove rnm entalism and Supranationalsm should not be taken to m ean that these theories are absolutely right or wrong, but rather, that we're dealing with a very complex political system. T he true value for political scientists lies in identifying subtle ways tlut these m odels ca n help us interpret the evide nce, and how the evidence helps us reinterpret them.
M o re importantly, this study has demonstrated that European executives have becom e m ore accountable for their European policies, and that national press ures are capable of indirectly influencing policy decisions at the European level. At the same time however, it seems that the link between natio nal politics and EU level politics is considerably weak. While the directly elected EP does attempt to reconcile this problem , it does not do so effectively. To ensure that the dem ocratic nature of the EU is improved, further research must b e done to advance our understanding of the true nature of the 'dem ocratic deficit' .
While tllis study has contributed som e valuable knowledge to theories ofEU politics and the democratic defi cit debate, it does not necessarily paint an accurate picture of the European Union today. Because it is difficult to gather evidence regarding the inner workings of the EU until many years after the fact , this study focused on the period of EMU development between 1989 and 1993. Since then, many changes have been made. Thus this study should serve as a work that future researchers can refer back to when attempting to m easure the successes and gains of the European Unio n as an ever increasingly successful democratic institutio n.
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